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INTRODUCTION 
How should a court handle a liability insurance policy sold to a tavern that 
purports to cover general commercial liability, yet contains an exclusion for 
liability “arising out of or in connection with the manufacturing, selling, 
distributing, serving or furnishing of any alcoholic beverages”?1 How about a 
 
† Executive Editor, Volume 166, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 2018, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2012, Bard College. My deepest gratitude to Executive 
Editor Alyssa Lattner, Comments Editor Max Linder, and all of this Comment's other editors for their 
meticulous work and helpful input. I am also tremendously grateful to Professor Tom Baker for 
inspiring my enthusiasm for insurance law, and for so graciously showing me the ropes in the field. 
1 Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694, 695 (S.D. Ind. 1996). 
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liability insurance policy sold to DISH Network that contains an exclusion 
for liability “arising out of the ownership, operation or use of any satellite”?2 
Or how about one that purports to cover a business for its liability arising out 
of “discrimination,” yet contains exclusions for discrimination that either 
violates a statute, is done knowingly or intentionally, is directed towards 
prospective, current, or wrongfully terminated employees, or is “committed 
on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, age or national origin”?3 
In all three of those cases, the policyholders argued that it would be unfair 
for the court to enforce the exclusions4 in their policies as they were written. 
Those exclusions, the policyholders argued, wiped out so much of the 
coverage that otherwise would have existed under the policies’ insuring 
clauses5 that the coverage would be practically worthless.6 Thus, the courts 
were asked to analyze those policies under the doctrine known as the Illusory 
Coverage Doctrine (ICD). The ICD is implicated when an insurance policy 
is written in such a way that could give the policyholder the “illusion” that 
the policy covers risks that are not actually covered. The ICD is somewhat 
obscure, and no precise formulation of the doctrine has yet achieved 
predominance among American jurisdictions. 
This Comment will discuss the status of the ICD in American insurance law, 
especially liability insurance law, and will also offer my own views as to how the 
doctrine can be best understood and refined. I will first argue that, while some 
courts have conceived of the issue of illusory coverage as an interpretive one 
related to contra proferentum, or as matter of “public policy,” the ICD is best 
understood instead as a doctrine of enforceability whose function is to protect 
policyholders from procedurally unconscionable insurance policies.7 
I will then address the questions of what standards are and ought to be 
used to determine whether an insurance policy “triggers” the ICD. In other 
 
2 Dish Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1153-54 (D. Colo. 2013), 
aff ’d sub nom. Dish Network Corp. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 772 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 2014). 
3 Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
4 “An ‘exclusion’ is a term in an insurance policy that identifies a category of claims that is not 
covered by the policy.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 32 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed 
Final Draft 2017).  
5 “An ‘insuring clause’ is a term in a liability insurance policy that grants insurance coverage.” 
Id. § 31. I will occasionally use the term “coverage provision” to refer to the same thing. 
6 In Mike’s Speedway, the court agreed with the policyholder that the “absolute liquor” exclusion 
rendered the tavern’s general commercial liability insurance illusory. 949 F. Supp. at 702. Likewise, 
the court in DISH Network found that the “Satellite Exclusion” rendered DISH Network’s coverage 
illusory, and thus that the exclusion was unenforceable. 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-54. In Jostens, the court 
did not disagree with the policyholder that its policy’s exclusions “effectively swallow the general 
grant of discrimination coverage,” but found that those exclusions were nonetheless enforceable 
because the policy still provided real coverage for other kinds of liability. 527 N.W.2d at 118-19. 
7 Throughout this Comment, I will use the term “policyholders” to refer to all insureds—people who 
are insured by an insurance policy. This is simply so that the reader does not mix up “insurers” and “insureds.” 
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words, how can we tell if an insurance policy features illusory coverage? My 
discussion of this issue will rely on a metaphor of shadows cast by exclusions 
upon the coverage that would otherwise exist. The shadow metaphor allows 
us to clearly visualize two distinct factors that could determine whether the 
ICD is triggered. The first, which I will call “scope,” corresponds to the size 
of the shadow: over how much insurance coverage must the exclusion’s shadow 
extend before the ICD is triggered? The second, which I will call “degree,” 
corresponds to the darkness of the shadow: does the coverage that falls beneath 
the exclusion’s shadow disappear completely, or is there still some possibility 
that the policyholder will be able to use that coverage? 
To clarify, consider a simple hypothetical liability insurance policy sold to 
the owner of private campgrounds. The policy has two insuring clauses: a 
Weather Clause granting coverage for weather-related injuries; and a Wildlife 
Clause granting coverage for wildlife-related injuries. Suppose further that the 
policy has a Lightning Exclusion removing coverage for injuries caused by 
lightning. The “scope” of the Lightning Exclusion would extend only to the 
coverage granted by the Weather Clause, not the Wildlife Clause. The “degree” 
to which the exclusion would eliminate the Weather Clause’s coverage would be 
rather low, since lightning comprises only a small proportion of weather-related 
risks. Thus, we should envision the Lightning Exclusion casting a faint shadow 
upon the coverage granted by the Weather Clause. 
Now suppose instead that the policy had a Serious Injury Exclusion, removing 
coverage for injuries from which the victim does not recover within twenty days. 
The scope of this exclusion would extend to the coverage granted by the Weather 
Clause and the Wildlife clause, since victims of both weather- and wildlife-related 
injuries can take longer than twenty days to recover. The degree to which the 
exclusion would eliminate coverage would be relatively high, since most injuries 
that generate lawsuits are too serious to recover from within twenty days. Thus, the 
Serious Injury Exclusion would cast a dark shadow over the coverage granted by 
both of the policy’s insuring clauses. 
With respect to scope, I will conclude that no scope should be construed as 
being so narrow as to preclude the ICD from being triggered. In other words, as 
long as the shadow cast by an exclusion is dark enough, the ICD should be 
triggered no matter how narrow the shadow is. Once the court finds any coverage 
shrouded in a shadow dark enough to trigger the ICD, the court should not 
proceed to consider how much other coverage is left beyond the shadow’s reach. 
With respect to degree, I will conclude that an exclusion should not need 
to completely eliminate the possibility that a policyholder could benefit from 
the overshadowed coverage in order to trigger the ICD. Instead, the ICD 
should be triggered if the coverage that remains available “is extremely 
minimal and affords no realistic protection” even if “there might be some 
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small circumstance where coverage could arguably exist.”8 In other words, the 
shadow must be very dark, but not necessarily pitch black. 
Returning to our campgrounds hypothetical, on my view, the coverage 
granted by the policy’s Wildlife Clause could be rendered illusory by a 
Terrestrial Animal Exclusion that removes coverage for injuries related to 
animals that live on land. If virtually all of the dangerous wildlife around the 
campgrounds are terrestrial animals—bees, bears, and so on—such an 
exclusion could make the coverage for wildlife-related injuries effectively 
useless to the policyholder. If the exclusion limits the Wildlife Clause’s 
coverage to only the most far-fetched of scenarios—like an aquatic crab 
somehow taking a camper’s eye out—it makes the coverage illusory. 
Once the ICD is triggered—that is, once the court has found a policy to 
contain illusory coverage—the next question is what the court should do 
about it. I will conclude that the right remedy for illusory coverage is to 
reform the offending exclusions—and only the offending exclusions—to 
conform to the policyholder’s reasonable expectations regarding their 
coverage. Thus, if an insurer denies coverage on the sole basis of an exclusion 
or set of exclusions that render the coverage illusory, the court should require 
the insurer to provide coverage if and only if the policyholder had a 
reasonable expectation that the policy made such coverage available. 
After explaining how the ICD works, I will discuss its relationship to the 
other doctrines that could be implicated by similar fact patterns—namely, 
contra proferentum and the doctrine of reasonable expectations—and explain 
why the ICD strikes a better balance than those alternative doctrines between 
the legitimate interests of policyholders and insurers. 
I. WHAT THE DOCTRINE IS AND WHY IT EXISTS 
A. Enforceability, not Interpretation 
Several courts have incorporated the principle that insurance policies 
should not contain illusory coverage into their interpretations of policies’ terms. 
The Superior Court of Delaware did this in a case in which the manufacturer 
of respiratory equipment sought coverage for its liability arising out of injuries 
that miners suffered when the equipment allegedly failed, causing the miners 
to inhale coal dust.9 One of the general liability policies under which the 
manufacturer sought coverage contained an exclusion barring coverage for 
injuries arising out of the “‘emission, discharge, seepage, release [or] escape’ 
 
8 Martinez v. Idaho Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 902, 907 (Idaho 2000). 
9 Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., No. CV N10C-07-241 MMJ, 2016 WL 498848, 
at *3-4 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2016). 
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of any ‘pollutant.’”10 The issue, therefore, was whether the coal dust floating 
around in coal mines as a result of the mining was a “pollutant.”11 The court 
compared the coal dust to “radiation used in medical x-rays” and “chlorine 
bleach used for cleaning” and concluded that such coal dust was not a pollutant 
because it was “in a place where [it] was reasonably expected to be” and the 
miners’ exposure to it “was a necessary part of the job.”12 
However, perhaps sensing that such reasoning was vulnerable to criticism, 
the court added the following: 
Any other interpretation would render the coverage illusory. To permit the 
Insurers to deny coverage under these circumstances would mean that there 
could never be coverage for any alleged failure or defect in the respiratory 
safety equipment manufactured by [the policyholder]. The Insurers could not 
have been surprised by the fact that the [policyholder], Mine Safety 
Appliances Company, manufactured safety appliances.”13 
Mine Safety seemed to treat the fact that a certain interpretation of an 
exclusion’s language would render coverage illusory as a reason to reject that 
interpretation. There is nothing wrong with such an approach. Indeed, to the 
extent that contract interpretation is about ascertaining the nature of the 
bargain the parties intended to make,14 it makes sense to be somewhat 
suspicious of an illusory coverage–creating interpretation of an exclusion. This 
is especially so where, as in Mine Safety, such an interpretation would defeat a 
major purpose for purchasing the policy. Just as constitutional interpretation 
may presume that the founders did not intend to enact a suicide pact, the 
interpretation of liability insurance policies may, at least to some extent, 
presume that policyholders do not intend to throw their money down the drain 
on useless insurance policies and leave themselves exposed to risks that they 
cannot afford to bear (and that state insurance regulators do not intend to 
allow such ineffective and overpriced policies to remain on the market). 
Note, however, that there is a difference between, on the one hand, 
disfavoring interpretations of ambiguous exclusions that would render 
coverage illusory, and, on the other hand, refusing to enforce unambiguous 
exclusions as they are written on the grounds that they would render coverage 
 
10 Id. at *3. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at *3-4. 
13 Id. at *4 (footnote omitted). 
14 See 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 32:2 (4th ed. 1993) (“Consistent with the notion that a contract represents the 
parties’ private agreement as to their legal relationship, liabilities and rights, the primary purpose 
and function of the court in interpreting a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ 
intention.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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illusory. In some cases, courts have said they were doing the former, when 
they were actually doing the latter.15 
The Supreme Court of Indiana did this in American States Insurance Co. v. 
Kiger, in which the owner of a Sunoco station sought coverage for his liability 
arising out of the leakage of gasoline from one of the station’s underground 
tanks.16 The owner had a comprehensive liability insurance policy—described 
by the court as a “garage policy”17—which contained an exclusion for liability 
“arising out of the . . . escape of ‘pollutants.’”18 The policy further stated that 
“Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant, 
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.”19 
As a matter of interpretation, the gasoline obviously was a “chemical” and 
its leakage into the ground obviously constituted the “escape” of a “pollutant.” 
Yet, the court presented a rather strained argument to the contrary.20 The court 
began by stating that the policy’s definition of “pollutants” “[c]learly . . . cannot 
be read literally as it would negate virtually all coverage. For example, if a visitor 
slips on a grease spill then, since grease is a ‘chemical,’ there would be no 
insurance coverage. Accordingly, this clause requires interpretation.”21 While it 
may be true that the exclusion would require interpretation as applied to a 
grease spill, that does not mean it requires interpretation as applied to the 
leakage of large amounts of gasoline into the ground, which is exactly the kind 
of occurrence that the pollution exclusion’s language calls to mind. 
Yet, the court proceeded to declare that since “the term ‘pollutant’ does 
not obviously include gasoline and, accordingly, is ambiguous, we . . . must 
construe the language against the insurer who drafted it.”22 It held that the 
“rule of construing exclusions strictly against the insurer and in favor of 
coverage . . . requires that coverage for the gasoline contamination which 
occurred be available” under the policy.23 
 
15 See, e.g., St. Mary’s Area Water Auth. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 
397, 411 (M.D. Pa. 2006), order vacated on reconsideration sub nom. St. Mary’s Area Water Auth. v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d 630 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (“The rationale [for applying the 
ICD] often is that the conflict between the coverage language and the exclusion language creates an 
ambiguity that must be resolved in favor of the insured.”); Isdoll v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 466 S.E.2d 
48, 50 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (reasoning that there was a “genuine ambiguity” in a policy because it’s 
express coverage for assault was rendered illusory by a provision that limited coverage to the 
performance of law enforcement duties, since “[i]t could always be argued that assault . . . do[es] not 
arise out of the performance of one’s duties”). 
16 662 N.E.2d 945, 946-47 (Ind. 1996). 
17 Id. at 948-49. 
18 Id. at 948. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 948-49. 
21 Id. at 948. 
22 Id. at 949. 
23 Id. 
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Notwithstanding the court’s strained interpretative analysis, it is clear 
from other lines in the opinion, which the court presented as if they were 
dicta, that the real reason behind the court’s holding was that it would be 
terribly unfair to the owner of a gasoline station if his liability insurance 
policy—a “garage policy,” which people generally expect to be well suited to 
such businesses’ needs—turned out not to cover liability related to gasoline 
leaks. “[T]hat an insurance company would sell a ‘garage policy’ to a gas 
station when that policy specifically excluded the major source of potential 
liability,” the court stated, “is, to say the least, strange.”24 The court later noted 
that it was “particularly troubled” by the interpretation of the policy that 
would mean that the policyholder “was sold a policy that provided no 
coverage for a large segment of the gas station’s business operations.”25 Giving 
the game away even more clearly, the court declared that “[i]f a garage policy 
is intended to exclude coverage for damage caused by the leakage of gasoline, 
the language of the contract must be explicit.”26 
As far as contract interpretation is concerned, it should make no difference 
whether this exclusion for gasoline leaks was explicitly declared or, as was the 
case, unambiguously implied by the broader pollution exclusion. Rather, the 
difference between stating something explicitly and implying something 
unambiguously is relevant only to the question of procedural 
unconscionability. Thus, it is apparent that the court’s holding was not really 
based on the contra proferentum cannon. Instead, its holding reflected a refusal 
to enforce the exclusion as it was written because the exclusion would render 
coverage that the policyholder reasonably expected to exist illusory. 
Courts should distinguish between the task of interpreting policies’ 
ambiguous exclusions and the task of determining whether or not an 
unambiguous exclusion should be enforced as written.27 It is in the 
enforceability context, not the interpretation context, that the ICD stands as 
its own doctrine. Several courts have expressly recognized the ICD as a basis 
upon which to grant coverage that would be barred under an exclusion if it 
were enforced as written.28 That is how courts should explain their holdings 
 
24 Id. at 948. 
25 Id. at 949. 
26 Id. 
27 For a good example of this distinction being drawn, see Danis v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 823 
N.E.2d 59, 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), in which the court stated “while the [policyholders] claim that 
the provision is ambiguous, what they really mean is that if the pollution exclusion is enforced as it 
reads, the policy will be rendered illusory.” 
28 See, e.g., Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Sunset Strip, Inc., No. 1:14-01273, 2015 WL 4545876, at *6 (S.D. 
Ind. July 28, 2015) (“If the policy is illusory, a court will not enforce the policy as written; instead, 
the court must enforce the policy ‘to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the insured.’”) (citations 
omitted); Great N. Ins. Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 05-635, 2008 WL 2048354, at *4 (W.D. Pa. 
May 12, 2008) (interpreting Pennsylvania law to hold that “if an exclusion provision would 
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in cases like Kiger, where they effectively reform unambiguous language to 
protect policyholders from the unfairness of illusory coverage. 
B. Procedural Unconscionability, not Public Policy 
Having established that the ICD is a doctrine of enforceability rather than 
interpretation, the next issue to discuss is what justifies the doctrine’s use. Some 
courts have dubiously characterized illusory coverage as a violation of public 
policy.29 Usually, however, the only “public policy” that can appropriately serve 
to invalidate the terms of an insurance contract is that which derives from federal 
or state constitutions, legislation, or the common law.30 Thus, for instance, an 
exclusion in an auto liability insurance policy that renders statutorily mandated 
coverage illusory may violate public policy. Such an exclusion would bring about 
a situation that the statute was enacted to prevent—namely, one in which victims 
of car accidents can have difficulty collecting compensation from negligent, 
 
effectively preclude coverage for all risks reasonably anticipated by the parties under a particular 
coverage provision (i.e., an illusory coverage provision), the coverage provision should be enforced 
in a way that would protect the reasonable expectations of the insured”); Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield 
Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“The illusory coverage doctrine . . . operates 
to qualify the general rule that courts will enforce an insurance contract as written.”); Gillund v. 
Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 778 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (“Where coverage is illusory, 
we have concluded that the contract should be reformed so that it comports with the insured’s 
reasonable expectations.”). 
29 See, e.g., Pompa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 520 F.3d 1139, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that 
“exclusions that render coverage illusory . . . . violate public policy” in Colorado) (citations omitted); 
Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694, 699 (S.D. Ind. 1996) 
(“Indiana courts have . . . held that insurance policies providing illusory coverage violate public 
policy.”); Roylance v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., No. CV 2006 9218, 2008 WL 4202018, at *2 (Idaho 
Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2008) (“When a policy provides only an illusion of coverage for its premiums, the 
policy will be considered void for violating public policy.”); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh 
v. Glenview Park Dist., 632 N.E.2d 1039, 1046 (Ill. 1994) (Bilandic, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that 
because an “exclusion deceptively affects the general liability risks that the endorsement purports to 
assume, the . . . exclusion violates public policy and should not be enforced”). 
30 One prominent insurance law treatise states that public policy comes only from “legislation 
(state and federal statutes) and constitutions,” “administrative regulations especially including the 
regulations promulgated by state departments of insurance,” and “judicial opinions enforcing the 
statutes and regulations and their public policy foundation though judicial construction of the 
statutes and regulations.” 15-114 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE ARCHIVE § 114.2 
(2d ed. 2011); see also Zeigler v. Ill. Tr. & Sav. Bank, 91 N.E. 1041, 1045-46 (Ill. 1910) (“The public 
policy of the state . . . is to be found in its Constitution and its statutes, and, when cases arise 
concerning matters upon which they are silent, then in its judicial decisions . . . . Courts will not 
look to other sources to determine the public policy of a state.”); Heller v. Pa. League of Cities & 
Municipalities, 32 A.3d 1213, 1220 (Pa. 2011) (“Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the 
laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interest.” (quoting 
Burstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 809 A.2d 204, 207 (Pa. 2002)); State Farm Gen. Ins. 
Co. v. Emerson, 687 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Wash. 1984) (“[W]e have been hesitant to invoke public policy 
to limit or avoid express contract terms absent legislative action.” (citations omitted)). 
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judgment-proof drivers.31 In fact, many courts have refused to enforce exclusions 
in auto liability insurance policies merely because they “narrow[] or restrict[] 
statutorily-mandated coverage.”32 
But no court has suggested that the ICD only applies to policies whose 
exclusions eviscerate the kind of coverage that is mandatory under legislation or 
the common law. In fact, such a limitation would mean that the ICD is completely 
swallowed by the broader public policy rule against exclusions that merely narrow 
or restrict such mandatory coverage.33 Thus, the only way to justify the ICD as a 
matter of public policy would be to point to statutes that specifically seek to 
prohibit policies that contain illusory coverage (which, if they exist at all, are not 
common) or to argue that the rule against illusory coverage is clearly enshrined in 
the common law (which, at least as of now, would be hard to do). 
Another problem with rooting the ICD in public policy is that courts tend to 
conceive of the doctrine as a means of protecting policyholders from getting 
ripped off by their insurers, rather than protecting third parties from insurance 
policies’ negative externalities.34 As Judge Richard Posner has explained, “The 
basic difference is that between a contract in which the parties combine to harm 
 
31 A situation similar to this arose in Martinez v. Idaho Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 
902 (Idaho 2000). There, the Supreme Court of Idaho found that an exclusion that rendered 
underinsured motorist coverage illusory also violated public policy because it deprived the policyholder 
of coverage that, pursuant to a state statute, could only be excluded from an auto insurance policy if the 
policyholder affirmatively rejects it in writing. Id. at 906-08. The court found that the underinsured 
motorist coverage must be available to the policyholder notwithstanding the exclusion, both because 
holding the policy void would defeat the purpose of the statute and because the insurer “is estopped 
from denying coverage because of the illusion of coverage it has created.” Id. at 908. 
32 Marcus v. Hanover Ins. Co., 740 So. 2d 603, 606 (La. 1999) (citing Block v. Reliance Ins. Co., 
433 So. 2d 1040, 1044 (La. 1983)). Marcus held a “business use exclusion” in an auto liability insurance 
policy to be unenforceable because it undermined a statutory scheme that was “intended to attach 
financial protection to the vehicle regardless of the purpose for which the vehicle is being operated.” 
Id. at 608. Most jurisdictions have also held that auto liability insurance policies’ “family member 
exclusions”—which remove coverage for claims that arise when policyholders injure their own family 
members—are also unenforceable because they contravene the purpose of statutes that make auto 
insurance mandatory. See Nat’l Cty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 879 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1993) (“The 
majority of jurisdictions with mandatory insurance laws hold family member exclusions invalid because 
they are contrary to public policy.”) (citing several cases); see also 15-114 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 
LAW & PRACTICE ARCHIVE § 114.2 (2d ed. 2011) (“An insurance contract term is not void as against 
public policy simply because the term narrows circumstances under which the insurance coverage 
applies, but only if the term directly limits statutorily mandated benefits.” (emphasis added)). 
33 See supra note 29 for cases applying this broader public policy rule. 
34 See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 951 F.2d 787, 790 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining 
that illusory coverage contracts, while they may not violate public policy, can be exploitative of a 
party); Buck v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 921 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (characterizing 
an interpretation of a policy that would create illusory coverage as one that would “take away on the 
one hand what it purports to offer with the other”); Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 647 N.W.2d 
223, 227, 238 (Wis. 2002) (affirming a lower court’s finding that an insurance policy was “illusory 
and therefore unenforceable” in part because the policies’ language sent “several false signals” and 
violated “the insured’s reasonable expectation of coverage”). 
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others . . . and a contract in which one party exploits the other. The former is the 
domain of the public policy defense, the latter of fraud, incapacity, and related 
defenses.”35 Accordingly, Judge Posner concluded that “[c]ontracts that are 
‘illusory’ in the sense of hopelessly or deceptively one-sided fail, if at all, on . . . 
grounds[] such as fraud, unconscionability, or undue influence.”36 
Of course, third parties may be harmed by the sale of insurance policies, 
especially liability insurance policies, that contain illusory coverage. Most 
obviously, if an exclusion renders certain coverage illusory, thus eliminating 
the insurer’s obligation to indemnify its policyholders for certain third-party 
tort claims, the injured victims who bring those claims may be unable to 
collect compensation for their injuries. However, the same could be said of 
all exclusions, whether they render coverage illusory or not, since exclusions, 
by definition, reduce the amount of coverage available under a policy.37 Thus, 
courts must maintain that, while exclusions in liability insurance policies 
make it more difficult for injured tort victims to receive compensation, they 
are not ipso facto contrary to public policy.38 
Since the most salient purpose of the ICD is to protect policyholders who 
unwittingly purchase insurance policies that provide much less coverage than 
they expected, the ICD is more related to procedural unconscionability39 and 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations than it is to public policy. The 
principle that came to be known as the doctrine of reasonable expectations 
was articulated by Professor Robert E. Keeton in a 1970 article as follows: 
“The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended 
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even 
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those 
expectations.”40 Since it relies on a distinction between features of insurance 
policies that are readily apparent to the policyholder and those that would go 
 
35 See Ashland Oil, 951 F.2d at 790. 
36 Id. 
37 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 32(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final 
Draft 2017). 
38 See Kelly v. Figueiredo, 610 A.2d 1296, 1299-1301 (Conn. 1992) (rejecting the argument that an 
exclusion in a liability insurance policy violated “the public policy goal of assuring that the innocent 
victims of injuries caused by intoxicated persons be able to recover compensation for those injuries” 
because they found no such public policy embodied in a statute (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Mendoza v. Rivera-Chavez, 999 P.2d 29, 36 (Wash. 2000) (stating in an analysis of the enforceability 
of a liability insurance policy’s exclusion that “[i]t is well established that insurance companies may 
limit their liability unless the limitation is contrary to public policy” (citation omitted)). 
39 “Procedural unconscionability” refers to unfairness in the formation process that deprives a 
party of a “meaningful choice about whether and how to enter into the transaction” by, for example, 
burying terms in “fine print or legal ‘gobbledygook.’” 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, 
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 1993).  
40 Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
961, 967 (1970). 
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unnoticed without “painstaking study” of the policy’s language, the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations can be understood as a protection against certain 
procedurally unconscionable terms. As discussed in Part III, the ICD can 
provide narrower and more predictable rules for determining whether an 
exclusion is so procedurally unconscionable as to render it unenforceable. 
II. HOW THE DOCTRINE WORKS 
This Part will discuss some variations in how different courts have 
formulated and applied the ICD, and will offer my own views on which 
versions should prevail. Sections A and B will discuss the scope and degree, 
respectively, of an exclusion’s impact on coverage that is necessary in order to 
find that the exclusion renders coverage illusory, thus “triggering” the ICD. 
Section C will discuss what the courts should do to protect policyholders after 
they have found that a policy contains illusory coverage. 
A. Scope in the Trigger Test: How Big Must the Shadow Be? 
The best position on the scope issue was displayed by a district court 
interpreting Pennsylvania law in Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Greenwich 
Insurance Co.41 Great Northern involved a policy with an insuring clause 
purporting to offer coverage for several kinds of losses, including “property 
damage . . . arising out of blowout or cratering.”42 “[B]lowout” and “cratering” 
were both defined in the policy.43 “[B]lowout” was defined as “an uncontrollable 
flow of gas, oil, drilling mud, water, well fluids, well materials, or a combination 
of any of them, from the wellhead or borehole, into the atmosphere, surface 
land or surface water or subterranean strata.”44 After the policyholder suffered 
property damage from a blowout, it sought coverage under the policy.45 The 
insurer attempted to deny coverage under the policy’s “Pollution Exclusion,” 
which provided that “[t]his insurance does not apply [to] property damage 
[caused by] alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, 
release or escape of pollutants at any time.”46 The policy defined “pollutants” 
as “any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including 
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acid, alkalis, chemicals and waste.”47 
 




45 Id. at *1. 
46 Id. Technically, the insurer did not try to completely “deny” coverage, but rather tried to use 
the exclusion to reduce the coverage’s limit from $1,000,000 to $100,000. Id. at *2. For these purposes, 
however, this would be the same as denying coverage. 
47 Id. at *2. 
1556 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1545 
The policyholder argued that the pollution exclusion rendered the policy’s 
coverage of blowouts illusory, since a “blowout, by definition, is a pollution 
event.”48 The insurer responded by pointing out that, even if the pollution 
exclusion eviscerated coverage for blowouts, it left coverage for cratering intact.49 
The court held that “[t]he question [of whether the ICD is triggered] is 
whether a particular coverage provision is swallowed-up by an exclusion, not 
whether the policy as a whole provides some degree of coverage despite the 
existence of an exclusion.”50 Under this formulation, the exclusion in question 
does not need to cast a shadow over all of a policy’s coverage in order to 
trigger the ICD, but rather only over any single “coverage provision.” The 
court went on to clarify that a “coverage provision” is any single kind of risk 
that an insuring clause describes as being covered: 
The policy language separates the words “blowout” and “cratering” with the 
disjunctive “or,” thereby providing coverage for two alternative risks. 
Greenwich’s insured payed a premium surcharge . . . for blowout or cratering 
coverage, and Greenwich cannot reasonably argue that the [pollution 
exclusion] does not render blowout coverage . . . illusory simply because the 
[coverage] is nevertheless available to cover cratering.51 
This tells us that the text purporting to cover “property damage . . . arising 
out of blowout or cratering”52 is actually two coverage provisions: one covering 
the risk of blowouts and another covering the risk of cratering. 
Under the court’s approach, there is no unit of coverage within a policy 
that is too small for the ICD to protect. If an exclusion casts a shadow on any 
single risk that any insuring clause purports to cover, the ICD can be triggered 
(as long as the shadow is dark enough). The court found that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the shadow cast by the pollution 
exclusion upon the blowout coverage was dark enough to trigger the ICD.53 
If the illusory coverage argument in Great Northern had been governed by 
Minnesota law, however, it almost certainly would have been defeated at 
summary judgment. This is because Minnesota’s courts have adopted the view 
that the ICD should only be triggered if all of the coverage to which a portion of the 
premium was specifically allocated is rendered illusory.54 Under the Minnesota rule, 
 
48 Id. at *6. 
49 Id. at *5. 
50 Id. (emphases added). 
51 Id. at *5 n.3. 
52 Id. at *5. 
53 Id. at *7. 
54 See Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“We 
believe that the doctrine of illusory coverage is best applied . . . where part of the premium is 
specifically allocated to a particular type or period of coverage and that coverage turns out to be 
functionally nonexistent.”); accord United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fid. Title Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 714, 719 
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even if the pollution exclusion in Great Northern had completely eliminated 
coverage for blowouts, the ICD would not have been triggered so long as it left 
the coverage for cratering intact, since the policyholder only paid one surcharge 
that was allocated to both blowout coverage and cratering coverage.55 Thus, under 
that rule, the ICD would have only been triggered if there was a surcharge 
allocated exclusively to the blowout coverage. 
An argument in favor of an approach like Minnesota’s—in which a shadow 
cast upon some coverage can fail to trigger the ICD because there is enough 
other coverage outside the shadow’s reach—was offered by a district court 
interpreting Indiana law in Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Sunset Strip, Inc.56 The 
court criticized the Great Northern approach—in which a shadow cast upon 
some coverage can trigger the ICD irrespective of how much other coverage 
remains outside the shadow’s reach—on grounds that it 
proves too much, as accepting this argument would allow any insured who has 
been denied coverage to prevail on an illusory coverage claim by drawing 
arbitrary lines in the insured’s policy. The insured, that is, could always argue 
that the relevant claims in the underlying case only pertain to a specific 
coverage provision, such that the Court should only analyze whether that 
specific provision is illusory and ignore any analysis pertaining to other 
provisions. By hypothesis, however, the insurer would have already determined 
that the claim at issue was not covered by the specific provision, such that the 
Court would necessarily conclude that coverage would not exist. This would 
automatically render that provision illusory, and . . . would thus effectively 
allow any insured to negate the effect of any coverage exclusion simply by 
ignoring the context of that exclusion in the insurance policy as a whole.57 
This argument overlooks the difference between two separate issues: 
(1) whether coverage for the specific occurrence that happened is barred by 
an exclusion; and (2) whether so many other occurrences, with different 
characteristics than the one that actually happened, would also be barred that 
the coverage must be rendered illusory. Just because the shadow cast upon a 
particular coverage provision is dark enough to eliminate coverage for the 
 
(8th Cir. 2001); see also Great W. Cas. Co. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 734 F. Supp. 2d 718, 738-39 (D. 
Minn. 2010) (finding the ICD to not be triggered because there was no specifically priced portion 
of the policy that was useless to the policyholder); Kabanuk Diversified Invs., Inc. v. Credit Gen. 
Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting a policyholder’s argument that it 
deserved certain coverage under the ICD because “[n]o evidence was presented that any premium 
was specifically allocated to [the] coverage” the policyholder sought). 
55 Great N., 2008 WL 2048354, at *5 n.3. 
56 No. 1:14-01273, 2015 WL 4545876, at *17 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 2015). 
57 Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
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actual occurrence that happened does not mean the shadow is dark enough to 
render that provision’s coverage illusory. 
In Great Northern, for instance, it was undisputed that the particular 
blowout for which the policyholder sought coverage constituted pollution, 
and thus would be barred from coverage if the pollution exclusion were 
enforced as written.58 But that did not mean that the blowout coverage was 
illusory. Rather, the policyholder had to show that almost all possible blowouts 
that could occur would also constitute pollution and be barred from 
coverage.59 Thus, it is not the case that, if the only coverage provisions that 
are relevant to the ICD’s triggering test are those that fall under the 
exclusion’s shadow, then a finding that coverage for a particular occurrence is 
barred by an exclusion would automatically trigger the ICD.60 
Moreover, the Nautilus court’s concern that policyholders could use the 
ICD to gain undeserved coverage by “drawing arbitrary lines”61 in the policy 
gets the problem backwards. The real problem of arbitrary line-drawing is the 
one that exists under approaches like Minnesota’s, where the ICD’s triggering 
test looks beyond the exclusion’s shadow to see how much other coverage 
remains intact. If the test required that the shadow extend to all of the coverage 
within a discretely priced piece of the policy—as Minnesota’s test does—then 
an insurer could avoid triggering the ICD by manipulating where it places the 
lines between those discretely priced pieces. 
For example, suppose that the insurer from Great Northern had started out 
with a policy that allocated, say, $1000 of the premium to blowout coverage and 
another $1000 of the premium to cratering coverage. Now suppose that a court 
found that the pollution exclusion rendered the blowout coverage, but not the 
cratering coverage, illusory. If the Minnesota rule applied, the insurer would be 
able to get around the ICD in the future by simply erasing the line between 
blowout coverage and cratering coverage and allocating $2000 of the premium 
to coverage for both blowouts and cratering. Why should that be? Is a person 
who pays $1000 in exchange only for blowout coverage entitled to more 
protection than a person who pays $2000 in exchange for both blowout coverage 
 
58 Great N., 2008 WL 2048354, at *7. 
59 The court ruled that the factual issue was whether non-pollution property damage resulting 
from a blowout can fairly be said to constitute a “reasonably expected set of circumstances.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting St. Mary’s Water Auth. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 397, 412 (M.D. Pa. 2006)). 
60 This can be seen even more clearly through the campgrounds hypothetical from the 
Introduction. Obviously, a Lightning Exclusion would not render a Weather Clause’s grant of 
coverage for weather-related injuries illusory, since such coverage would still be available for injuries 
related to any other weather-related phenomenon besides lightning, such as extreme temperatures, 
heavy precipitation, and violent winds. 
61 No. 1:14-01273, 2015 WL 4545876, at *17 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 2015). 
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and $1000’s worth of cratering coverage? Surely not.62 Thus, tests that look 
beyond the shadow to see how much other coverage remains beyond its scope 
are the tests that allow arbitrary line-drawing to bring about unfair outcomes. 
There is no good reason for the ICD’s trigger test to look beyond the 
shadow to see how much coverage remains unaffected by the exclusion in 
question. In other words, there should be no such thing as a shadow that is 
“too small” to trigger the ICD.63 The ICD’s test should focus, then, not on 
the scope of the exclusion’s effect on the policy’s coverage, but only on the 
degree to which the exclusion reduces the possibility that a given piece of 
coverage will actually come in handy to the policyholder.64 
B. Degree in the Trigger Test: How Dark Must the Shadow Be? 
The next issue in the ICD’s trigger test is the question of degree. How 
dark of a shadow must an exclusion (or multiple exclusions65) cast upon 
coverage in order to render the coverage illusory and trigger the ICD? 
One conceivable answer is that the coverage is only illusory if it is 
impossible for any occurrence to fall within the coverage without also falling 
within the exclusion. The simplest way for this to happen would be for an 
insuring clause to say “X” is covered and for an exclusion to say that “X” is 
excluded from coverage. Yet, since the statement “X and not-X” is 
 
62 See W. Reserve Mut. Cas. Co. v. Holland, 666 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (finding 
the ICD to be triggered because an auto insurance policy’s underinsured motorist coverage was 
illusory, even though the premium paid for that coverage also paid for non-illusory uninsured motorist 
coverage, because “[a]n insurer cannot charge a premium for two conceptually distinct types of 
coverage, at a presumably higher rate than would be charged for one type of coverage, if both types 
of coverage do not actually exist”); see also Ile v. Foremost Ins. Co., 809 N.W.2d 617, 625-26 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Holland, 666 N.E. 2d at 969), rev’d sub nom. Ile ex rel. Estate of Ile v. Foremost 
Ins. Co., 823 N.W.2d 426 (Mich. 2012). 
63 This position may seem unfair to insurers, who may innocently add exclusions to their 
insurance forms that incidentally happen to render coverage illusory for one little risk in one little 
insuring clause. However, as discussed in Section II.C, the most appropriate safeguard for insurers’ 
interests in such situations is a rule whereby, once an exclusion is found to have triggered the ICD, it 
should only be reformed to the extent that it is contrary to the policyholder’s reasonable expectations. 
That way, the only (tiny) pieces of coverage that the ICD would protect against ICD-triggering 
exclusions would be those that the policyholder reasonably expected to possess. 
64 See TIG Ins. Co. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 2d 439, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (“The relevant 
inquiry is ‘whether a particular coverage provision is swallowed-up by an exclusion, not whether the 
policy as a whole provides some degree of coverage despite the existence of an exclusion.’” (quoting 
Great N. Ins. Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co, No. 05-635, 2008 WL 2048354, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2008))). 
65 I add “or multiple exclusions” here to point out that it does not matter whether a policy 
contains only one exclusion that casts a shadow of a certain darkness over a certain area of coverage, 
or multiple exclusions that collectively cast a shadow of the same darkness over that same area. For 
example, a group of twenty-six exclusions—one for “A,” one for “B,” and so on all the way through 
“Z”—should be analyzed as if it were a single exclusion for “the letters A through Z.” See, e.g., 
Martinez v. Idaho Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 902, 906-07 (Idaho 2000) (holding 
that the cumulative effect of three different exclusions rendered coverage illusory). 
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ambiguous66—does it mean X, not-X, or something else?—it seems that contra 
proferentum could be employed to interpret the policy in the policyholder’s 
favor, rendering the ICD unnecessary. 
More often, however, such complete elimination of coverage will arise 
because an exclusion is broader than an insuring clause. For instance, Purrelli v. 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.67 involved a liability insurance policy that had an 
insuring clause providing coverage for “personal injury” and that explicitly 
included “invasion of rights of privacy” in its definition of that term.68 However, 
the policy also had an exclusion for personal injuries that were “expected or 
intended” by the insured.69 The court found that “invasion of privacy [is] an 
intentional tort” and that it “can only be actionable if done intentionally.”70 In 
other words, the court found that a specific thing in an insuring clause (invasion 
of rights to privacy) belonged to a more general class of things (personal injuries 
that are expected or intended) that was subject to an exclusion. 
Here, too, the ICD is unnecessary. But what makes it unnecessary is not contra 
proferentum; rather, it is another black letter principle of contract interpretation 
under which, “[t]o the extent of any conflict, specific provisions control over more 
general ones.”71 Pursuant to this principle, the term that addresses how to handle 
the specific issue of invasions of privacy should be construed as an exception to 
the term that addresses how to handle the more general issue of expected or 
intended personal injuries. Thus the policy would be construed to grant coverage 
for invasions of privacy notwithstanding the exclusion for expected or intended 
injuries before the ICD entered into the analysis.72 
Since the ICD seems unnecessary where an exclusion makes coverage under 
an insuring clause completely impossible, the real question is whether the ICD 
should be applicable to exclusions that diminish coverage to a less-than-absolute 
degree. In other words, should there be shadows that are not quite “pitch-black” 
but that are nonetheless dark enough to trigger the ICD? A few courts have 
discussed this issue in ways that could be taken to suggest that their answer is 
 
66 See Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1380 (Md. 1997) (“If the exclusion totally 
swallows the insuring provision, the provisions are completely contradictory. That is the grossest 
form of ambiguity . . . .”). 
67 698 So. 2d 618, 619-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
68 Id. at 619. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 620. 
71 Grynberg v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 296 S.W.3d 132, 137 (Tex. App. 2009); accord DCV 
Holdings, Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., 889 A.2d 954, 961 (Del. 2005) (“Specific language in a contract 
controls over general language, and where specific and general provisions conflict, the specific 
provision ordinarily qualifies the meaning of the general one.”). 
72 Notably, this specific-trumps-general principle of contract interpretation would give the 
policyholder more protection than the ICD, because the (specific) coverage would override the (general) 
exclusion no matter what. Under the ICD, however, as discussed in the next Section, the coverage would 
only override the exclusion insofar as the insurer had a reasonable expectation of coverage. 
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no.73 However, none of those courts actually held that the ICD could only be 
triggered by exclusions that completely eliminate coverage; rather, they were 
saying that such pitch-black shadows are sufficient to trigger the ICD, without 
deciding whether they are necessary.74 
The prevailing view is that the ICD can be triggered by exclusions that do 
not completely eliminate the possibility of the policyholder benefiting from the 
coverage in question.75 Courts have varied, however, in how they describe the 
degree to which an exclusion must eliminate coverage in order to trigger the 
ICD. One common—though, as I will explain, imperfect—formulation of this 
non-absolutist standard is that coverage is illusory when there is no “reasonably 
 
73 See, e.g., Bagley v. Monticello Ins. Co., 720 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Mass. 1999) (“[I]f the policy still 
provides coverage for some acts, it is not illusory simply because of a potentially wide exclusion.”); Danis 
v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 823 N.E.2d 59, 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (“An insurance contract is not illusory 
where the insured obtains some benefit.”); see also, e.g., Titan Indem. Co. v. Cameron, No. 01-5435, 2002 
WL 1774059, at *18 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2002) (quoting Bagley), aff ’d, 77 F. App’x 91 (3d Cir. 2003); Associated 
Cmty. Bancorp, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 989 N.Y.S.2d 15, 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (same). 
74 In Bagley, the court held that an exclusion for illegal acts did not render a general liability 
policy illusory, because the policy still covered plenty of liability arising out of legal acts. 720 N.E.2d 
at 818. In Danis, the court held that a pollution exclusion in a directors’ and officers’ liability policy 
did not create illusory coverage because it left coverage available for pollution-related shareholder 
derivative suits, which are not all that unlikely. 823 N.E.2d at 74. In Titan, the court found that 
coverage in a law enforcement officer’s liability insurance policy for civil rights violations was not 
rendered illusory by an exclusion for expected or intended harm, because there would still be 
coverage in the highly plausible scenario in which a civil rights violation was committed without 
knowledge or intent (e.g., by using objectively unreasonable force). 2002 WL 1774059, at *19. In 
Associated Cmty. Bancorp, the court held that coverage under a “Bankers Professional Liability 
Insuring Agreement” was not rendered illusory by an exclusion for claims for “the actual loss of 
money, securities, property or other items of value in the custody or control of [the bank]” because 
the exclusion left a “broad range of coverage” in place “that may arise in connection with plaintiffs’ 
provision of ordinary banking services.” 989 N.Y.S.2d at 16. Thus, none of these cases held that even 
the slightest possibility of coverage benefiting a policyholder is enough to make it non-illusory. 
75 See Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694, 701 (S.D. Ind. 
1996) (“[A]n insurer cannot avoid an illusory coverage problem by simply conceiving of a single 
hypothetical situation to which coverage would apply[, because] illusory coverage is a matter of 
degree, not absolutes.”); Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1131 (D.C. 2001) (finding 
that coverage was not illusory because it was not “non-existent or de minimis”); Martinez v. Idaho 
Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 902, 907 (Idaho 2000) (holding that coverage is illusory 
if “it is extremely minimal and affords no realistic protection to any group or class of injured persons,” 
even if “there might be some small circumstance where coverage could arguably exist”); Davidson v. 
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 572 N.E.2d 502, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that coverage is illusory if it 
“will not [yield] benefits under any reasonably expected set of circumstances”); Pressman v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 574 A.2d 757, 759 (R.I. 1990) (holding coverage to be illusory because it would be 
precluded “in almost any circumstance” aside from the highly unlikely scenario in which “the insured 
had his own generator located inside the building”); Gillund v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 778 N.W.2d 
662, 668 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (“Coverage is illusory when an insured cannot foresee any 
circumstances under which he or she would collect under a particular policy provision.”). 
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expected set of circumstances” under which the policyholder would be able to 
collect benefits from the policy.76 
A revealing illustration of what this “reasonably expected set of 
circumstances” standard actually means was provided by Haag v. Castro.77 That 
case involved a business auto liability insurance policy that covered liability 
for injuries arising out of accidents with rented vehicles, but only while the 
rented vehicle was “being used in the business of the Named Insured.”78 The 
named insured was the Indiana Youth Soccer Association (“IYSA”).79 After an 
IYSA-certified soccer coach got into an accident while driving his team around 
in a rented car on a team-building whitewater rafting trip, the insurer denied 
coverage on the basis that the vehicle was not being used “in the business” of 
the IYSA at the time of the accident.80 The Supreme Court of Indiana agreed 
that the vehicle’s use was not in the business of the IYSA, because the IYSA’s 
business was limited to “(1) promoting soccer or (2) regulating leagues, teams, 
players, and referees or (3) conducting specific events.”81 
The court also found that the business use restriction did not render 
coverage for rental car accidents illusory.82 It reiterated Indiana’s rule that 
“[c]overage under an insurance policy is not illusory unless the policy would not 
pay benefits under any reasonably expected set of circumstances.”83 And it 
reasoned that there were circumstances in which the coverage would be valuable: 
In the course of traveling to promote youth soccer or in transporting a 
celebrity guest—perhaps a member of our national team like Lauren Cheney 
or Lori Lindsey—to an IYSA sponsored event, an employee or volunteer 
might be involved in an auto accident while using a rented vehicle. The 
coverage is not illusory.84 
 
76 See Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richie, 540 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind. 1989), vacated on reh’g, 544 
N.E.2d 488 (Ind. 1989); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Vemma Int’l Holdings Inc., No. 16-01071, 2016 
WL 4059606, at *8 (D. Ariz. July 29, 2016) (interpreting Arizona law to hold that coverage is illusory 
if it “would result in no payment of benefits under any reasonably expected circumstances”); Great 
N. Ins. Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 05-635, 2008 WL 2048354, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2008) 
(quoting Meridian as a representation of the rule under Pennsylvania law); Link v. Gen. Cas. Co. of 
Wis., 518 N.W.2d 261, 263 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (same for Wisconsin law). 
77 959 N.E.2d 819 (Ind. 2012). 
78 Id. at 821. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 824-25. Reasonable people can disagree over this, as did a dissenting judge. See id. at 
826-27 (Dickson, J., dissenting) (“[A] reasonable construction of the hired auto endorsement 
supports coverage . . . .”). However, for these purposes, let us suppose that the majority was correct 
that the business use restriction would preclude coverage for the claim at issue if enforced as written. 
82 Id. at 824. 
83 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
84 Id. 
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The Indiana Supreme Court’s ICD analysis in Haag reveals that its 
“reasonably expected set of circumstances” formulation does not clearly 
express its true standard. The set of circumstances that prevented the ICD 
from being triggered—namely, circumstances under which a rental car is 
being used in the IYSA’s business—did not need to be expected (let alone 
reasonably expected) to arise. Rather, the court found it was sufficient that 
such circumstances “might” arise. Thus, it seems as though what the court is 
looking for are not circumstances that are reasonably expected, but possible 
circumstances that are simply not far-fetched. 
Accordingly, the “reasonably expected set of circumstances” formulation 
should be jettisoned and replaced with formulations that more straightforwardly 
convey that the probability of the coverage ever benefiting the policyholder 
needs to be very close to zero.85 One court offered the following helpful 
guidance in this vein: “‘[A]n insurer cannot avoid an illusory coverage problem 
by simply conceiving of a single hypothetical situation to which coverage would 
apply.’ A plaintiff relying on the [ICD] can prevail by showing that the 
likelihood of coverage is ‘sufficiently remote to be deemed illusory.’”86 
But, setting aside quibbles about how best to articulate the standard, the 
prevailing view among American courts that have adopted the ICD is that it can 
be triggered by exclusions that do not absolutely eliminate coverage, as long as 
they come close. The shadows have to be very dark, but not necessarily pitch-black. 
C. Reforming Policies That Have Illusory Coverage 
Once a court determines that the ICD has been triggered—which is to say 
that the policy contains illusory coverage—the next question is, so what? Should 
the illusory coverage–creating exclusion be automatically struck from the policy 
 
85 For good examples of these plausibility-themed formulations, see Colo. Intergovernmental 
Risk Sharing Agency v. Northfield Ins. Co., 207 P.3d 839, 843 (Colo. App. 2008) (“Exclusions 
impermissibly render coverage illusory when they in effect allow the insurer to receive premiums 
when realistically it is not incurring any risk of liability.” (quoting O’Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 
696 P.2d 282, 285 (Colo. 1985))); Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1131 (D.C. 2001) 
(finding that coverage was not illusory because it was not “non-existent or de minimis”); Martinez 
v. Idaho Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 902, 907 (Idaho 2000) (holding that coverage is 
illusory if “it is extremely minimal and affords no realistic protection to any group or class of injured 
persons,” even if “there might be some small circumstance where coverage could arguably exist”); 
Pressman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 574 A.2d 757, 759 (R.I. 1990) (holding coverage to be illusory 
because it would be precluded “in almost any circumstance” aside from the highly unlikely scenario 
in which “the insured had his own generator located inside the building”). 
86 Great N. Ins. Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 05-635, 2008 WL 2048354, at *5 (W.D. Pa. 
May 12, 2008) (quoting Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694, 701 
(S.D. Ind. 1996) and Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richie, 540 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind. 1989)); see also 
Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Sunset Strip, Inc., No. 1:14-01273, 2015 WL 4545876, at *6 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 
2015) (“Indiana courts have phrased this inquiry as whether the hypothetical coverage is so 
sufficiently remote [as] to be deemed illusory.” (quoting Monticello Ins. Co., 949 F. Supp. at 701)). 
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entirely? To my knowledge, no court has applied such an approach. Instead, 
following Indiana’s lead, courts typically hold that an illusory coverage–creating 
exclusion should be reformed only insofar as it contradicts the policyholder’s 
reasonable expectations regarding the coverage available under the policy.87 The 
clearest articulation of this rule in the case law is as follows: 
[An] illusory coverage argument . . . requires a two-part analysis: The Court 
must first determine whether the policy is in fact illusory. If the policy is not 
illusory, then the unambiguous terms of the policy control . . . . If the policy 
is illusory, then the Court must then determine whether [the policyholder] 
had a reasonable expectation that claims such as [the] cause of action [for 
which the policyholder is seeking coverage] would be covered by the policy.88 
A helpful illustration of this rule’s application can be found in the case 
described in this Comment’s opening sentence, Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s 
Speedway Lounge, Inc.89 There, an insurance company sold a tavern a general 
commercial liability insurance policy that contained an “absolute liquor” 
exclusion that barred coverage for claims “arising out of or in connection with 
the manufacturing, selling, distributing, serving, or furnishing of any 
alcoholic beverages.”90 When the tavern was sued for failing to prevent one 
of its intoxicated patrons from killing another patron and sought coverage 
from its insurer, the insurer tried to deny coverage on the basis of the absolute 
liquor exclusion.91 The court found that the exclusion was so broad that it 
rendered the tavern’s commercial general liability coverage illusory.92 
 
87 See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 774 F.3d 702, 709 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A] court 
must not interpret a policy to allow an insurer to provide largely illusory coverage. In other words, 
‘Georgia public policy disfavors insurance provisions that permit the insurer, at the expense of the 
insured, to avoid the risk for which the insurer has been paid and for which the insured reasonably 
expects it is covered.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Barrett v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 
696 S.E.2d 326, 330 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010))); Monticello Ins. Co., 949 F. Supp. at 704 (denying an 
insurance company’s motion for summary judgment under Indiana law because the coverage that it 
sold its insured was illusory, and the insured had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
it had reasonably expected the claim in question to be covered when it bought the policy); Davidson 
v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 572 N.E.2d 502, 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“Provisions in an insurance policy, 
which are unambiguous when read within the policy as a whole, but in effect, provide only illusory 
coverage, should be enforced to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); Gillund v. 
Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 778 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (“Where coverage is illusory, 
we have concluded that the contract should be reformed so that it comports with the insured’s 
reasonable expectations.”). 
88 Nautilus, 2015 WL 4545876, at *6. 
89 949 F. Supp. 694. 
90 Id. at 696. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 702 (“[W]hile there might be some possibility of claims against a tavern that cannot 
be said to have arisen out of . . . the business of selling, distributing, serving, or furnishing alcoholic 
beverages, the prospect seems to be ‘sufficiently remote’ as to warrant the conclusion that this 
coverage was illusory.”). 
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Yet, the finding that the absolute liquor exclusion rendered coverage 
illusory was not sufficient to make that exclusion unenforceable against the 
claim for which the tavern sought coverage. Rather, the court also had to find, 
as a factual matter, that the tavern’s owner had reasonably expected claims 
like the one at issue to be covered by the policy at the time he purchased it.93 
The court summarized its analysis of this factual issue as follows: 
[The tavern] has raised a genuine issue of material fact on the question of its 
reasonable expectation of coverage. [Its owner] contracted to buy commercial 
general liability coverage for a tavern. His affidavit provides evidence that he 
aimed to obtain insurance against the risk that patrons would suffer injury on 
the premises. [The owner] explains that he purchased insurance in order to 
protect [the tavern] from liability resulting from the business of furnishing 
alcoholic beverages to patrons. The policy on its face purports to provide 
commercial general liability coverage for a tavern, yet also purports to 
exclude from coverage any personal injury and property damage claims 
“connected with” the selling, distributing, manufacturing, or furnishing of 
alcoholic beverages. The policy language in and of itself is sufficient to create 
a genuine issue of material fact as to [the owner’s] reasonable expectation of 
insurance coverage.94 
Mike’s Speedway also involves another issue related to how courts should reform 
policies once they have been found to contain illusory coverage. We can think of 
it as the issue of “multiple sufficient shadows.” Suppose there are two separate 
exclusions that each casts its own shadow on the same coverage. And suppose 
either of those exclusions would be independently sufficient to deny coverage for 
the claim brought by the policyholder. What if one of those shadows is dark 
enough to trigger the ICD, while the other shadow is not? Should the 
policyholder’s reasonable expectations override the effects of both of those 
exclusions, so that the claim is deemed to be covered? Or should the exclusion that 
casts the fainter, non-illusory coverage–creating shadow remain enforceable, 
regardless of the policyholder’s reasonable expectations, so as to deny the claim? 
In Mike’s Speedway, there were two additional exclusions that did not 
create illusory coverage and that, if enforced, would have provided a sound 
basis for denying the tavern’s claim—an “assault and battery” exclusion and a 
“dram shop” exclusion.95 “The issue here,” the court stated, “is whether, as a 
matter of law, [the insurer] may rely on these other exclusions to defeat 
coverage under a policy that provided only illusory liability coverage from 
 
93 Id. at 702-04. 
94 Id. at 704. 
95 Id. at 696-97, 703. 
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the beginning.”96 It held that “Indiana courts would not permit [the insurer] 
to take advantage of these other exclusions” because “Indiana courts treat 
illusory insurance coverage as a violation of public policy” and “[f]rom that 
perspective, an insurance company that has sold illusory coverage is not likely 
to receive a sympathetic audience for its arguments that other exclusions 
nevertheless still bar coverage.”97 Thus, the Mike’s Speedway court effectively 
held that, if any exclusion casts a shadow over a piece of coverage that alone 
is dark enough to trigger the ICD, then all exclusions that cast separate 
shadows on that same piece of coverage are unenforceable to the extent that 
they conflict with the policyholder’s reasonable expectations. 
Other courts disagree. For example, in DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty 
Insurance Co., the court held that a “Satellite Exclusion” in DISH Network’s 
liability insurance policy was unenforceable because the court could “envision 
no scenario in which the exclusion would not apply.”98 However, the court 
nonetheless allowed the insurer to rely on “another, legally sound exclusion” as 
a basis upon which to deny coverage for DISH Network’s claim.99 Likewise, in 
Gillund v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Co., the court held that, even if an 
insurance policy’s limitation of coverage to “accidents” rendered its purported 
coverage for invasions of privacy illusory, the insurer could still rely on a valid 
exclusion for violations of penal laws to deny coverage to a policyholder whose 
invasion of privacy amounted to such a violation.100 
I agree with the approach taken in DISH Network and Gillund, under which 
the fact that one exclusion’s enforcement would render certain coverage illusory 
has no effect on the enforceability of other non-illusory coverage–creating 
exclusions with respect to that same coverage. The contrary approach taken in 
Mike’s Speedway could create unfair windfalls for policyholders and put insurers 
in excessive danger of being forced to cover more risk than they intended to 
underwrite. That approach would also unduly complicate coverage disputes, 
since it would give policyholders a reason to challenge various arguably illusory 
coverage–creating exclusions in their policies that otherwise would have been 
totally irrelevant to a dispute. 
 
96 Id. at 703. 
97 Id. 
98 989 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1153-54 (D. Colo. 2013), aff ’d sub nom. Dish Network Corp. v. Arrowood 
Indem. Co., 772 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 2014). The Satellite Exclusion stated that “This insurance does 
not apply to Bodily Injury, Property Damage, Personal Injury or Advertising Injury arising out of 
the ownership, operation or use of any satellite.” Id. at 1153. Since DISH Network is “in the 
subscription satellite television business,” the exclusion, if enforced, would apply to virtually all of 
DISH Network’s claims. Id. at 1153-54. 
99 Id. at 1154. The “legally sound” exclusion was a “Business Exclusion” that barred coverage 
for “‘[a]dvertising injury’ arising out of . . . an offense committed by an insured whose business is 
advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting.” Id. at 1146-47. 
100 778 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). 
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The Mike’s Speedway approach appears to be motivated by a desire to deter 
insurers from issuing policies with exclusions that trigger the ICD. But 
sufficient deterrence would be created by overriding those “bad” exclusions 
with the policyholder’s reasonable expectations, even if all the other 
exclusions remained fully enforceable. For these reasons, the only exclusions 
that should be overridden by policyholders’ reasonable expectations pursuant 
to the ICD should be those that actually trigger the ICD.101 
III. HOW THE DOCTRINE COMPARES TO ITS ALTERNATIVES 
Given the background principle that insurance policies should generally be 
construed as they are written,102 any doctrine whose purpose is to require 
insurers to provide coverage that is excluded by the unambiguous language of 
their policies could seem adverse to the interests of the insurance industry. 
Thus, it is worth noting that the ICD is friendlier to the insurance industry 
than the alternative doctrines that could be implicated by the same fact 
patterns, namely conta preferentum and the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 
A. The ICD and Contra Proferentum 
If a court looks at an exclusion that casts a dark shadow over coverage and 
sees ambiguity, the court will apply contra proferentum and resolve the 
ambiguity in the policyholder’s favor, even if the policyholder had no 
reasonable expectation of coverage. If, on the other hand, the court looks at 
the same policy and instead sees illusory coverage, the court will only grant 
coverage if the policyholder can show that he or she reasonably expected the 
coverage to be available. 
 
101 Notice the difference between (1) the situations discussed here, in which there is one 
illusory coverage–creating exclusion and one non-illusory coverage–creating exclusion, and each is 
independently sufficient to deny the policyholder’s claim, and (2) situations in which illusory 
coverage is created by the cumulative effects of multiple exclusions. An example of the former would 
be a policy with both an exclusion for “A” and an exclusion for “A-Z,” while an example of the latter 
would be a policy with twenty-six exclusions, one for each letter of the alphabet. If a policyholder 
brings a claim for “A,” and reasonably expects “A” to be covered, his coverage should be denied if he 
has the former policy, because the illusory coverage–creating “A-Z” exclusion should not invalidate 
the “A” exclusion that is independently sufficient to deny the claim. But coverage for “A” should be 
granted if he has the latter policy, because the cumulative effect of the “A” exclusion combined with 
the twenty-five other exclusions effectively creates an “A-Z” exclusion that triggers the ICD. 
102 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 3 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 
2017) (stating that there is a “presumption in favor of plain meaning” in insurance policy 
interpretation); see also 16 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS § 49:14 (4th ed. 1993) (stating that the terms of insurance policies, like those in 
other kinds of contracts, should be “accorded their plain and ordinary, popular or commonly 
accepted meaning, unless it appears from the policy itself or by usage that the parties intended to 
use the words in a special or technical sense” (footnotes omitted)). 
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This difference can be neatly illustrated by comparing Kiger and Mike’s 
Speedway. In Kiger, a gas station’s “garage policy” had a pollution exclusion that 
“excluded the major source of potential liability.”103 The same could be said of the 
absolute liquor exclusion in the policy sold to the tavern in Mike’s Speedway.104 
Yet, the court in Kiger saw ambiguity and held that the “rule of construing 
exclusions strictly against the insurer and in favor of coverage . . . requires that 
coverage for the gasoline contamination which occurred be available.”105 In 
contrast, the court in Mike’s Speedway saw illusory coverage and held that the 
policyholder could only receive the coverage he sought upon establishing that he 
reasonably expected such coverage at the time the policy was issued.106 
Thus, conceiving of illusory coverage as a special issue governed by its own 
doctrine, and not as a form of ambiguity, would be an insurer-friendly move. 
B. The ICD and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations 
The ICD is also far friendlier to insurers than the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations. The crux of the doctrine of reasonable expectations is that “[t]he 
objectively reasonable expectations of [policyholders] regarding the terms of 
insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy 
provisions would have negated those expectations.”107 This is obviously a more 
expansive, pro-policyholder doctrine than the ICD, which requires that coverage 
be rendered illusory and that it be reasonably expected by the policyholder. 
The reasonable expectations doctrine’s leading case is C & J Fertilizer, Inc. 
v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. There, the policy at issue offered coverage for 
“burglary” but contained what the court described as an “exclusion . . . 
masking as a definition.”108 Buried in “fine print,” the exclusion removed 
coverage for burglaries from which there were no “visible marks made by 
tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the 
exterior of the premises at the place of such entry.”109 The policyholder 
brought a claim for a burglary that left such visible marks on a door in the 
interior of the premises, but not the exterior, which was where the policy’s 
fine print required the marks to be.110 The Iowa Supreme Court held that, 
notwithstanding the exclusion “bur[ied]” in the written policy, the 
 
103 Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E. 2d 945, 948 (Ind. 1996). 
104 Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694, 702 (S.D. Ind. 1996). 
105 662 N.E.2d at 949. 
106 949 F. Supp. at 704. 
107 Keeton, supra note 40, at 967. For a review of the doctrine of illusory expectations, see 
generally Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two 
Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990). 
108 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975). 
109 Id. at 171. 
110 Id. 
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policyholder had a reasonable expectation that burglaries such as the one that 
occurred would be covered under the policy.111 On that basis, the court held 
that “the doctrine [of reasonable expectations] demands” that the burglary be 
deemed covered by the policy.112 
Analyzing the same facts under the ICD, however, would have led to 
victory for the insurer. Clearly, the possibility of a burglary leaving the visible 
marks of force and violence on a premises’ exterior, as required for coverage 
under the policy, is not so remote as to render the coverage illusory. Thus, the 
ICD would not have been triggered by the policy, and the analysis would 
never have reached the reasonable expectations prong, so coverage would have 
been validly denied. 
The ICD can therefore be viewed as a narrowing of the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations. It restricts the circumstances under which a policyholder’s 
reasonable expectations should override a policy’s clear terms to those in which 
the insurer seeks to rely on exclusions that not only eliminate coverage for the 
specific claim being brought by the policyholder, but that also render certain 
coverage illusory. In other words, the ICD puts an illusory-coverage “filter” on 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations.113 
This filter ameliorates the doctrine of reasonable expectations’ main 
drawback, which is that it leaves insurers so uncertain about what risks they 
will actually be required to bear under their policies that they have trouble 
pricing them efficiently. Replacing the doctrine of reasonable expectations 
with the ICD would dramatically reduce insurers’ uncertainty, because it is 
much easier for insurers to predict whether their policies will be held to 
contain illusory coverage than whether their policies will be held to violate a 
policyholder’s reasonable expectations. 
While there is obviously some vagueness in the standard for illusory 
coverage—how dark of a shadow is too dark?—there is far more vagueness in 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations. For one thing, a court’s judgment as to 
the reasonableness of a policyholder’s expectations turns on the amount of 
effort the court determines the policyholder should have made to read and 
understand the policy—a difficult determination for parties to predict in 
advance. The illusory-coverage “filter” would give insurers a “safe harbor”: if 
insurers want to avoid the risk that a court will find it reasonable for a 
 
111 Id. at 177. 
112 Id. 
113 This way of looking at the ICD fits nicely with the Nautilus court’s “two-part analysis” for 
the ICD—the first part looking at whether the coverage sought by the policyholder is illusory, and 
only the second part looking at whether the policyholder had a reasonable expectation of such 
coverage being available under the policy. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Sunset Strip, Inc., No. 1:14-01273, 2015 
WL 4545876, at *6 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 2015). 
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policyholder to expect coverage notwithstanding unambiguous exclusions, they 
can do so by making sure those exclusions do not render the coverage illusory. 
Or, going the other way, if insurers are nervous that an exclusion might trigger 
the ICD, they can protect themselves by taking care to clearly explain the effect 
of that exclusion to their applicants, so that their policyholders could never hold 
reasonable expectations that conflict with the exclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has attempted to explain what the ICD is, how it works 
(and should work), and how it compares to related doctrines pertaining to 
insurance contracts’ interpretation and enforceability. In summary, the ICD 
is a doctrine of insurance contract enforceability, as opposed to interpretation, 
that serves to protect policyholders from procedurally unconscionable 
exclusions that almost completely wipe out the coverage purportedly available 
under their policies. If any coverage purportedly offered by the policy—no 
matter how “small” that coverage is in comparison with the remainder of the 
policy—is so restricted by an exclusion that the policyholder’s chance of 
actually benefiting from that coverage drops to almost zero, the coverage is 
rendered illusory, and the ICD is triggered. The exclusions that trigger the 
ICD—and only those exclusions—should be reformed to the extent that they 
conflict with the policyholder’s reasonable expectations. Thus, if a 
policyholder had a reasonable expectation for coverage that was rendered 
illusory by an exclusion, the policy should be enforced, contrary to that 
exclusion’s unambiguous meaning, so as provide that coverage. 
The ICD is certainly a pro-policyholder exception to the general principle 
that insurance contracts should be construed as they are written. But compared 
to the other doctrines that could be invoked in similar circumstances, the ICD 
provides policyholders with narrower protection and insurers with greater 
certainty of what risks they will ultimately be required to bear. The ICD 
requires policies to be enforced contrary to the meaning of their terms only 
when they are procedurally unconscionable—which insurers should be able to 
foresee when they draft the policies—and only to the extent that they deprive 
policyholders of coverage they reasonably expected. In this way, the ICD 
strikes a satisfying balance between the interests of policyholders and insurers. 
